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Abstract 
Despite the persistent threat from disasters to human health worldwide, 
meaningful lessons in preparedness are rarely integrated into the health 
professional curricula of those likely to be first responders.  Although core 
competencies in disaster management have been identified, little is known 
about how to translate those competencies into multiple curricula across 
diverse groups who must function together in complex, emotionally charged 
conditions. In an unprecedented collective response, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Chhem & Abdel-Wahab, Vienna, Austria) 
worked with the first medical responders (Hasegawa & Kumagai) at Japan’s 
Fukushima Medical University (FMU) on a project led by educational 
scholars (Hibbert, Canada and Engle-Hills, South Africa) to address needed 
changes to curriculum that would authentically reflect the lessons learned. 
Taking a qualitative approach to study experiences of the first medical 
responders, this study highlights the role of context as a disruptor to the best 
laid curricular plans, and considers a collective response to plan for our 
futures. 
 
Keywords: Curriculum as social practice; Collective competency; Critical 
narrative inquiry; Interdisciplinary; Teaching for social relevance. 
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Teaching is not simply a technical enterprise: rather, it is a creative process of healing 
re-integration, re-membering and re-collection. 
Huebner, 1991, cf Slattery, 2013, xx 
Overview 
 Nearly three decades ago, Japanese Canadian curriculum scholar Ted 
Aoki argued that “science must be taught as a humanity” (Smith, cf Aoki, 1993, 
p. 255). The humanities help us think critically and creatively while maintaining a 
healthy scepticism; to communicate and collaborate with individuals and groups 
across interdisciplinary settings; and to better understand the role of science 
within society (Flexner, 1930). Yet, in the years since, it seems that much of the 
curriculum around the world has been obfuscated by neoliberal ideologies that 
have moved the field further away from his call.  In this paper, the implicit 
assumption that curriculum is comprised essentially of explicit, standardized, 
discrete skills transferable to any situation is challenged. Instead, we 
demonstrate through the case of Fukushima, the need to consider curriculum as 
a social practice, where humanity and context become critical to action.  In 
particular, following Bourdieu (1977, p. 4) we ask, what are the curricular and 
cultural conditions which make knowledge of curriculum as a social practice 
possible?.  
 Shifting Curricular Conditions 
 There is little agreement on what is meant by the word ‘curriculum’ either 
within or outside of the field. A century ago, Franklin Bobbitt argued that 
curriculum could be essentially understood in two ways: 
1) the entire range of experience, both undirected and directed, concerned in 
unfolding the abilities of the individual; 
2) The series of consciously directed training experiences … for completing and 
perfecting the unfoldment (Bobbitt, 1918, p. 43). 
 Even then, Bobbitt had observed that the educational profession tended to 
think of curriculum in terms of the latter sense. Several conditions have 
emerged since then, that have only further emphasized attention to the notion of 
“directed training” and “perfecting” what many consider to be curriculum. In 
medical education, standardized, competency-based models have proliferated 
in response to the need for increased efficiency, safety, and responses to audit 
and accreditation systems (Ellaway, Albright, Smothers, Cameron & Willett, 
2014) as much as the often stated value of improving patient care. 
 The shift to curriculum as ‘prescriptive’ 
 Several factors have brought curriculum makers to emphasize an 
essentialist view that mirrors the latter half of Bobbitt’s definition. For example, in 
the past century, we have moved from educating the elite, to educating the 
masses. Globalization and increased labour mobility, coupled with International 
testing, led to the push for standardization and consistency that would allow 
credentials to be more portable. The shift from an Industrial Age to an Information 
Age turned attention to what some have called the ‘Knowledge Economy’ (e.g., 
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Adler, 2001).  With education more prominently tied to economic production 
interests, it became vulnerable to increased influence from business models.  
 A good example of economic influence was seen with The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). With a motto of “‘Better 
Policies for Better Lives” their mission is “to promote policies that will improve the 
economic and social well-being of people around the world” 
(http://www.oecd.org/about/). The OECD achieves their mission through sharing 
information, data analyses and policies with various governments. Amongst other 
activities, they measure productivity and look for similarities and differences 
across countries. 
 On the face of it, the desire for systematic, consistent and predictable 
curriculum is understandable. Its value is even more pronounced in a context 
concerned with safety. However, Slattery (2013) argues that predictability is a 
“goal that needs to be deconstructed and examined more closely” as it has 
“actually contributed to the current crises both locally and globally” (p. xiii). While 
the pragmatic approach to comparing programs, models and policies is appealing 
(Gonzalo et al., 2017), it has a number of perhaps unintended consequences. 
Despite sharing a number of characteristics and goals, the practical application of 
ideas across cultures and contexts is not a uniform and unproblematic 
endeavour. As aims are translated into models, attention turns to producing 
largely generic learning outcomes, teaching strategies and assessment practices. 
However, this approach makes a number of assumptions (Binns, p. 760). It 
assumes that if educators are simply aware of curriculum designs, strategies and 
forms of assessment, they will use them. It assumes that the designs are 
universally effective, and it assumes that if the guidelines are detailed enough, 
that teachers will follow them in predictable, controllable ways. Experience has 
shown that curriculum reform is far more complex, nuanced and contextualized 
than described (Hawick, Cleland & Kitto, 2017; Shaw & Jackson, 2002). 
 Rethinking training for competence 
 The faith placed in standardization as a means to both develop and assess 
competency is naïve in its assumption of the neutrality of the individuals, the 
culture and context within which educational encounters take place. Training is a 
model “driven by a narrow instrumentalism based upon economic imperatives --
… soft skills required for the workplace rather than the sort of powerful 
knowledge required to engage with the world” (Priestley & Biesta, 2013, p. 5). 
Even the language of training first permeated and then dominated medical 
educational discourses in many parts of the world. In a competitive, comparative 
environment, much attention is now paid to ensuring conformity, achievement 
and to the extent that is possible, transferability. In a number of contexts, these 
outcomes are desirable, and even necessary to a seamless operation of highly 
technical skills. However, it is important to recognize that they are also 
fragmented and disembedded from unpredictable contexts. They anticipate a 
consistent application of knowledge and skills in an inconsistent world. Exercises 
designed for training (e.g., table top examples) are limited to our ability to 
anticipate (or acknowledge) possible scenarios. They also resist individual or 
professional autonomy and systemic flexibility.   
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 Such concerns have prompted scholars (Hodges & Lingard, 2012) to take 
another look at the goals surrounding competency, questioning whether 
competency and change ought to be targeting individuals, or the social contexts 
within which they practice. The idea individuals can be trained to be competent 
“implies that competence is context-free” (Lingard, 2016, p. S19-S20). Given the 
complexities of the challenges faced by contemporary professionals and the need 
for collaboration and teamwork, the focus on individual competence seems 
insufficient.  Similarly, the belief in the ability to design a universal set of 
competencies to suit all contexts, is naïve. Making the shift to thinking about 
collective or contextualized competence is not easy or straightforward. It cannot 
be assumed for example, that teams that need to form around a problem are 
existing, harmonious groups, or that the culture of the system within which they 
do their work is amenable to developing collective competence: 
Collective competence is evolving, unstable and based on situations with varying 
social relations and material conditions that can support or constrain teamwork in 
the moment. Social relations on teams are complex and nuanced, shaped by 
issues such as conflict, power, respect, and trust. (Lingard, 2016, p. S19-S20) 
 In reality, we need both; competent individuals and competent teams. In the 
context of a nuclear accident, the context is arguably one of the most 
challenging, high pressure and time sensitive issues to test collective 
competence. How can curricula be designed to attend to the complexity, yet 
acknowledge the conflict, the power struggles, and the issues of trust and respect 
that unfold in the midst of such a significant event? We have to let go of our 
fantasy that we can control and predict the reality within which we engage in our 
worlds. 
 Curriculum as Social Practice 
Learning … doesn’t just involve the acquisition of facts about the world, it also 
involves acquiring the ability to act in the world in socially recognized ways.  
(Seely Brown & Duguid, 2001, p. 200) 
 More than ever before, we are planning curriculum for an uncertain future. 
As Bourdieu (1977) cautions, if “subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what 
they’re doing, that what they do has more meaning than they know “(p. 79). A 
social practice orientation to planning acknowledges this reality, and draws on 
what we do know in ways that help plan in more sophisticated ways, taking into 
account the social relations that people draw upon in their practices (Barton & 
Potts, 2013, p. 816). It is an acknowledgement that curriculum making occurs as 
a result of living in, and through our worlds. Nettleton and Green (2014) invite us 
to think about how context, circumstance and practice coalesce because 
“practical (rather than cognitive or intellectual) reasoning underpins action” (p. 
241). Scholars are beginning to imagine strategies for developing capacity in this 
area:  
 Consider  collective (self) positioning in relation to the curriculum experience as 
an alternative to a rational curriculum model; 
 Examine the potentialities afforded by transformative rather than normative 
approaches to practices in the curriculum that recognize the resources learners 
bring into the learning encounter; 
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 Recognize the role of interprofessional faculty development in curriculum design 
and enactment as an ongoing collaborative and scholarly process of inquiry.  
 Expand the limited focus on standardizing instrumental responses to engender 
coherence and flexibility through contextualized, critical encounters between 
students, lecturers and subject disciplines.  
(Adapted from Weller, 2012, p. 22) 
 If we think about curriculum making as a more “holistic process of 
engagement with, rather than the acquiring of, disciplinary knowledge” it better 
reflects the “complex social practice” within which we are working to 
“demonstrate transferable critical thinking and problem solving skills” (Weller, 
2012, p. 25, emphasis ours). A social practice approach makes room for students 
to relate the curriculum to their own experiences, and what they know of the 
world.  Rather than taking a learning outcome approach that expects to achieve 
consistency and uniformity across programs of study, this approach recognizes 
the complexities of the world that we are preparing our graduates to enter, and 
their need to apply situated knowledge to suit the problems before them and the 
iterative, relational process needed to achieve it.  
 Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
 Bourdieu’s (1972) Theory of Practice conceptualizes three elements central 
to practice: field, capital and habitus. He theorized that social fields are rendered 
visible empirically. The fields are tacitly understood by those interacting in a 
network of positions at play within various structures. Within the social field 
Bourdieu identified particular sets of helpful resources as capital. Capital could be 
social, symbolic, economic or cultural (Bourdieu, 1986) and largely influenced an 
individual’s position within the social fields. The positions individuals hold 
influence which practices are possible, and which are not. Finally, he developed 
the concept of habitus (1977), a multi-layered notion that demonstrates that not 
only are we practicing in the social world, but the social world is acting on (at 
times reproducing) us; predisposing us to certain dispositions or behaviours. 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice, in our case, alerts us to the socialization of 
curriculum-makers; to the ways in which embodied practice can reproduce 
socialized understandings; and, how context can disrupt all three notions of field, 
capital and habitus.    
Context is a disruptor because habitus is linked to individuals’ histories and 
experiences with the world. To better understand this, we adopted a Critical 
Narrative Inquiry (CNI) (Iannacci, 2007) approach as a way of documenting and 
analyzing experiences. CNI is   
… a collaboration between researcher and participants, over time, in a place or 
series of places, and in social interaction with milieus. An inquirer enters this matrix 
in the midst and progresses in this same spirit, concluding the inquiry still in the 
midst of living and telling, reliving and retelling, the stories of the experiences that 
make up people’s lives, both individual and social. Simply stated … narrative 
inquiry is stories lived and told” (Connelly & Clandinin, 2000, p. 20). 
 We were interested in understanding how the experiences of those living 
through a global crisis could shed light on the conditions needed to practice 
differently. CNI invites us to question what has been or what is, in favour of what 
might be.  (Barone, 2001a, p. 736). It is a  methodology that attends to the 
context and the emotions central to lived experience (Denzin, 1992), bringing 
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various parts of human experience together in ways that allow participants to 
collaborate in the telling and interpreting of events retrospectively (Freeman, 
2007). Consistent with CNI approaches, understanding how and where power 
operates and is expressed, the counter-narratives, and the silences, helps 
identify the issues that   allow an informed response or action in a complex, 
socially entangled future. 
 The Case of Fukushima 
 Background 
 On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck Japan’s north-
eastern shore.  The Great East Japan Earthquake generated a powerful tsunami 
that damaged the reactors at the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, causing the worst nuclear accident since 
Chernobyl. Following the accident, staff from the Division of Human Health at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, worked closely with staff 
from Fukushima Medical University, to coordinate response efforts. Early on in 
the recovery process, lengthy interviews were conducted, documenting the 
experiences of 18 physicians, nurses, psychologists and psychiatrists, radiation 
safety experts, administrators and leaders who formed a contingent of first 
responders to the accident.  
 Sixteen interviewees were men, and two were women. The semi-structured 
interviews took, on average, about an hour and a half. The interviews all began 
by inviting the interviewee to describe their relevant personal and professional 
background, before turning to the events of March 11, 2011. As each interview 
unfolded, the interviewer probed the stories to learn more about their readiness 
and response before ending with questions about what they believed, given this 
experience, was needed in terms of curriculum reform efforts. The interviews 
were then transcribed and translated into English.  
 The analysis was an iterative process, undertaken by the educational 
researchers on the team. The first phase of the analysis employed a 
biopsychosocial lens (Jehn & Techakesari, 2014) to organize the interviews 
according to their physical responses, their emotional responses and the social, 
contextual and cultural factors within which they were acting. The interview texts 
were then restoried into a consistent narrative arc that allowed them to be 
analysed a second time, looking for the overarching ‘meta stories’ that were 
emerging from the experiences. In phase two, we conducted a workshop 
modelling curricular responses to the data, engaging participants in activities 
such as role play, debate, and designing communication briefs for various 
audiences. We also documented their reconceptualised classroom spaces and 
individual course materials.  In the final phase, data was analysed through a 
curricular lens informed by our theoretical framework and shared in Japan on the 
5th anniversary of the accident.  
Key Findings 
The key findings that we have articulated in this section underscore the 
tension between the acquisition of knowledge, and the application of knowledge 
in context. In this study, confidence in the knowledge and training provided, in the 
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systems that had been established to respond to nuclear accidents, in the ability 
to communicate what they knew at a time of intense public fear and distrust – 
was not only shaken, it was irrevocably damaged. The Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident became a call for change. 
Faith in Training  
To begin with, our findings pointed to a faith in training as a precautionary 
measure to address potential risks. Prior to 2011, the programmatic curriculum 
largely focused on radiation emergency medicine. For example, What is 
radiation? What are radiation effects? How do you treat a contaminated person? 
How do you treat radiation exposure? Since Fukushima Medical University was 
designated as a hospital for radiation emergency medicine in Japan, training was 
provided to ensure adequate knowledge: 
That’s just a very short course, one-week course for radiation emergency and a 
formal one. They had some demonstration and desktop drills including lectures and 
also other things. Our institute has many training courses for medical doctors and 
first responders in Asia. We learned much from the course in the US. Every year 
we have invited experts from Asian countries and we trained these people from 
Asia, and at the same time we also learned ourselves (P2). 
 Skills, such as how to measure radiation were considered to be important 
at that time. Hospitals designated as radiation emergency medicine sites used 
their own materials, including textbooks but were not standardized. Participants 
had mixed feelings about this training. P8 told us, 
My feeling for this nuclear power plant disaster training, I think it is not so effective 
if disaster happened because the training all took place offsite and each training 
group was independent. It was really just about the ceremony.  
 The most commonly held ‘unexamined norms’ of the group of participants 
in this collective, was a belief that a nuclear accident simply would not, could not 
occur. In Japanese – the word shinwa –mythology – is used to describe the 
collective belief in total nuclear safety.  It was a hard reality to accept that nothing 
is zero risk. 
 A second narrative that emerged from the data was that “almost all doctors, 
knew about “radiology” but almost no doctor knew about radiation health effects 
to the human body” (P11). Doctors were taught about radiology in the context of 
reading CT images, performing ultrasound and looking at chest x-rays. Those 
who had received some education about radiation health effects had forgotten 
their training over the years, as there was no call to use that knowledge in a 
clinical setting.  
The medical oncologists know how to kill tumour cells, but they don’t know much 
about radiation risk and radiation protection. Because radiation protection is a very 
specific field, it was believed that general medical doctors don’t need it (P4). 
The Complexity of the Incident 
 The complexity of the incident also emerged as an important finding. As 
P17 described, 
… we were not ready for this kind of disaster where a natural disaster combined 
with a nuclear accident. We have never been prepared for this kind of event. Since 
1999, we have been preparing for the event of isolated radiation accident (P17).  
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 The skills needed to handle radioisotopes would be an acknowledgement 
of the frailty of the belief in nuclear safety. “We have to be more aware of the 
possibilities of bad things happening including bad things involving nuclear 
facilities. Of course, that kind of knowledge should be enhanced” (P17). 
A darker side to the ‘hidden curriculum’ is the ways in which fear of nuclear 
exposure manifests in discrimination against the ‘exposed’.  P16 tells us that we 
can learn from lessons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, because those victims were 
labelled as hibakusha.  
If you translate that from Japanese, it would mean the “exposed people”. That word 
was used in a discriminatory way. Some hibakusha had tried to move out of 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki, so that people would not know that they are from the 
affected area. Those hibakusha might have thought “I am not able to have a happy 
life. I am not able to get married.” A woman might say that “I will not be able to 
have children, because I’ve been irradiated and I won’t have a happy life for my 
children.” Social awareness is a key to solve this issue, because I think that’s the 
primary factor to fight against discrimination. 
 P9 underlined the concern for such discrimination. 
All Japanese people wanted exact information about radiation exposure. Just after 
the explosion of the Fukushima nuclear plant, as residents of Fukushima 
evacuated to other places, they were met with fear. People believed that if patients 
from Fukushima come near me, I will get contaminated – so don’t come! Even my 
son said, ‘Father! I can’t marry anyone except a girl from Fukushima’. Fearing he 
had internal exposure, he believed he would not be able to marry a girl from 
another place Stigma is a very important problem.  
 A narrative concerning the null curriculum flowed from the hidden 
curriculum. Cultural beliefs can powerfully shape practice. The belief in the safety 
of nuclear facilities led to a focus on disaster response teams such as DMAT, 
well prepared for responding to earthquakes and tsunamis, but rarely prepared 
for radiation. Since this was a combined tragedy, responders were unprepared to 
take care of patients contaminated with radionuclides and/or radiation exposure.  
        The existing curriculum had not anticipated the critical need for public 
communication. Instead, it focused on a time-honoured practice of developing 
medical expertise. There was little ‘practical training’ according to the 
participants, and certainly no preparation for being ambushed by an angry and 
frightened public or the media. P7 pleaded for help “to make sure the people who 
are talking in front of the cameras or into the microphones know what they’re 
talking about”. Communication was a widespread problem. Information was at 
first slow to come out from a government scrambling to manage three crises at 
once; when it did start to flow, it was at times contradictory and at best, difficult to 
understand:  
There were many experts in the government. They provided various information to 
the public. However, the public did not understand whether these experts were 
right, because government experts said that effects of radiation were not 
dangerous and that 1 mSv was no problem. On the other hand, other experts were 
saying that 1mSv was too high. This was very confusing to the public (P1). 
 The need for Communication around Risk Management and Mental Health 
 A story of risk management and mental health emerged as critical to this 
accident. P4 visited several locations and gave advice. His first responsibility was 
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to share the current state of scientific knowledge with the public. Translating 
highly technical scientific knowledge in ‘lay’ terms was very difficult, particularly 
about the radiation effects on health. He had studied it for a long time based on 
long term studies of “a-bomb” survivors. From that research, he acquired the 
knowledge and technology of radiation risks and radiation protection. He went to 
the public places like schools, arenas and even households. P4 recalls, 
As you know, a radiation accident induces not only physical damages but also a 
psychological and social problems. So many people are suffering from various 
problems. People worry about health condition. Particularly the parents who have 
young children worry about the health condition of their children. Also, many 
Fukushima residents are worried about food contamination; furthermore, they 
suffered from the harmful rumours. There are the huge economic damages 
because of harmful rumours. It is very difficult to explain the issue. Radiation risk is 
not simple. Generally speaking, we are not familiar with the idea or concept of risk. 
We tend to have black-and white viewpoint. On the other hand, risk is not a black 
and white issue. We can’t say this is absolutely safe or this is absolutely risky. 
There are some risks for everything, but we are barely conscious of this reality in 
our daily life. Particularly, cancer risk by radiation exposure is considered as 
stochastic effect. This means that there is a linear relationship between radiation 
dose and cancer risk.  
 The level of confusion and the fear that followed in the aftermath of the 
accident was a problem that grew. Many respondents claimed that the Mental 
Health issues were the biggest casualty of the accident. “Almost all the staff were 
scared about radiation after the second explosion of Unit 3, including me” (P2).  
… all we could do is just fear. Nurses asked me, whether they’re safe or not. But I 
can’t answer their question before the support team come to FMU. Actually, except 
radiation disaster, we prepared and experienced for natural disasters like 
earthquakes and tsunami. Disaster medical assistance team have already existed. 
Without radiation, we are familiar with facing disaster. So we strongly rely on usual 
system of disaster management.  
 The usual systems of management P2 referred to were learned in 
exercises like table top training; a method that was widely used prior to the 
accident. Scenarios were imagined, and then trainees were invited to participate 
in a simulated response. This approach to training proved necessary but 
insufficient in the face of the accident:  
Usually I taught doctors how to do situations faced with contaminated patients, how 
to treat, how to guard from contaminated patients but unfortunately we didn’t 
imagine a situation where everything was contaminated. After the nuclear power 
plant accident, everything in the Fukushima prefecture was contaminated; the 
ground was contaminated, cars were contaminated. Before accident, our training 
scenarios focused on small isolated accidents inside a NPP. Only contaminated 
patients were imagined to be transported to our hospital, where everything but the 
patient was clean. But this was completely different.  Everything was contaminated, 
and the radiation dose level is completely different from what we had predicted. 
(P5) 
 Counter-narratives emerged in the context of preparedness. There was a 
lack of coordination amongst the various institutional organizations who touched 
on responsibilities for the complexity of such a large accident. For example, The 
Ministry of Health told the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) not to get 
involved in radiation disaster medicine because that is the job the Ministry of 
Science Technology and Education. But P17 now believes, 
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We need to incorporate more on radiation and radiation medicine and radiation 
disaster in to the medical education. We need to have coordination, and mitigate 
friction between the ministries, or some laws which restricted our ability to respond 
easily. We need some laws to coordinate and lead the system regardless of the 
ministries.  
 In short, there was a need for a change in the way that people in Japan 
think about their relationships within and between organizational structures and 
institutions and in terms of how they approach education and training. P17 
provides an explanation:  
The Fukushima NPP accident is a kind of turning point; we must change. Not only 
our medical education but also the human relationship we have with society. In 
Japan, for example, it is very competitive to enter the good universities and the 
school of medicine for university. So it means young people, especially in junior 
and high school, only concentrate on entering the good universities to learn only 
knowledge-based studies. Even after entering the school of medicine, everything is 
about certifying – they must pass examinations. Even after graduation, in their first 
or second year of training, they enter a specialized course, so they are always 
focusing on just a small field. If this kind of education system continues, nothing 
changes. So this is a turning point in the history of our education; one in which the 
university plays an important role. We must learn how to ask different questions 
and learn how to think differently.  We do not have to become masters at debating, 
but we need to learn lessons from history, philosophy and sociology for example, 
so that we can learn to think differently.   
 Inadequacy of Knowledge of Risk and Emergency among those Left to 
Lead 
 The experiences of first responders were where all of the planning and 
articulation of goals and objectives are truly tested in the real world. P2 said he 
was simply not prepared for a radiation accident. “To my regret, I don’t have 
knowledge nor preparedness for radiation emergency medicine…in either 
material or mind”. P1 describes the fear and confusion. He had forgotten all of the 
content that he had studied at NIRS 10 years ago, honestly admitting, 
All I remember was that I just enjoyed drinking. When I learned that the patients 
were coming, I started to relearn. There was no time. I remembered where the 
textbook was on the shelf and I started reading. During the disaster, I had a huge 
number of new experiences. My sensitivity decreased mentally and physically from 
exhaustion. All I could do in that moment was ask a radiation specialist to protect 
me. I called my friend who is in radiation medicine, “Please come to the radiation 
contamination examination space and please, let’s face this together.” I asked 
nurses -not young nurses but older or middle-aged nurses to join me. Also 
specialists; those in charge of taking X-ray, also operating computer tomography 
machine and magnetic sources of imaging and radiation specialists. The early 
phase of the team building relied on just my personal contacts. I was completely 
tired – too tired to care for patients and also worry about the risk of radiation. I lost 
the will to take care of my risk. Exhaustion makes human beings worry less about 
the risk. It’s important. Lesson learnt. 
 P1 described going to the J Village, a front-line base for responding to the 
accident. The radiation workers, the police, the fire fighters – all were worried 
about their exposure and the effects of radiation. In the hospital, he observed that 
the equipment was sufficient. Most hospitals deemed to be radiation emergency 
hospitals had radiation detectors. “But the medical doctors did not have enough 
knowledge about how to use the radiation detector, especially the whole body 
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counter (WBC). Even when they could measure amounts of radionuclide in the 
body by WBC, they did not how to estimate the dose of internal contamination.” 
 They also quickly realized that anxiety was significantly higher than what 
they would have expected given the relatively low exposure. “We are being 
exposed to natural radiation every day but doses are not so high. Therefore, 
actually we should not have much anxiety from the low-dose radiation exposure” 
(P1). But people were very anxious about any level of exposure, which was 
leading to an increase in other health risks.  
 P2 thought that there was a need for all hospitals to know the basic things 
about radiation emergency. Without that basic knowledge, they cannot examine 
patients related to the radiation disaster. 
If we can’t assess the risks facing our patient and ourselves, we cannot respond. 
Globally, we should learn how to face critical situations - not only radiation disaster 
- but general critical situations. Doctors and students need to learn how to make 
decisions in critical situations. One reason why doctors were scared of radiation 
was due to the lack of knowledge and the lack of the awareness of risk 
themselves. Without their own safety guidelines to assess the risk, we did not have 
enough awareness for facing a crisis situation, not only due to the radiation, but all 
other risks. So after disaster, I try to have our own risk ruler. Also, in case of 
lecturing I request students to have their own risk ruler. Risk scale. Without their 
own risk scale, people can’t make decisions by themselves.  
 The Lack of Coordination among Key Players and Organizations 
 Expert knowledge alone was not enough to make decisions however. 
There was widespread agreement that a multi-disciplinary response was needed 
to tackle an accident of this magnitude. Trying to communicate across 
disciplinary specialties was not easy but they group pulled together and used 
some practical strategies to make it work: 
We held meetings, multi-disciplinary meetings that were largely about information 
sharing. In the early phase of the disaster, we held a morning conference with a 
member joining radiation emergency medicine, a member of the containing support 
team, and also nurses and specialists and doctors and logistics. To hold our focus, 
we prepared small lectures. To build our motivation, we reported on what we had 
been able to achieve. To use time effectively, we try to focus on urgent problems 
and also stop complaining to the Tokyo Electric power company. We also wrote 
our goals on the palms of our hands, so we would not lose sight of them. 
 They exemplified the notion of learning on the job. As P15 tells us, they 
… were forced to adapt to circumstances. The reality didn’t go as described in the 
manual. For example, at the screening of affected residents, the screening level of 
surface contamination was 13,000 CPM. With this regulation, there were too many 
people for us to decontaminate at the same time. Additionally, it was too cold to 
decontaminate them. This situation indicated that we had to keep them in cold 
outside for a long time, and it would exposed them to other health risks such as flu, 
pneumonia, hypothermia.  Therefore, our team proposed to change the 
decontamination level. It was approved by the local government and the nuclear 
safety committee in Japan. So they changed the level for the decontamination 
promptly. 
 The Physical Challenges 
 On top of all of these challenges, there was a serious lack of water. The 
Self-Defence Force was placed in charge of decontamination in some places. 
The water supply was interrupted, so they carried the water by truck, but still the 
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water was running short for decontamination. Information systems were 
interrupted and much of the early information was gleaned from the television, 
and later the internet. Roads in some places were impassable, railway lines 
broken and store shelves empty of food. Those that came to offer support arrived 
by helicopter, but had no means of transportation so they stayed together, night 
after night at the university hospital.  Exhausted emotionally and physically, the 
expressed their fear, their anger and their disbelief at their predicament to one 
another. Eventually, they resigned themselves to the fact that in his moment, at 
this time, they were the only team in the position to accept this challenge and 
they changed their outlook. It was a philosophical shift; it wasn’t about technique 
or skill, but a shift toward their responsibility to humankind.  
I realized my starting point as medical doctor by this Fukushima disaster, because 
humanity, human ability is most important in this case. So I realized that. Every 
time when I meet the residents, every time when I face the contaminated patient, 
every time we are teaching the doctors, every time the most important thing is the 
human ability. So this accident made me realize this; to go back to the starting 
point of becoming a medical doctor. (P7) 
Discussion 
We began our inquiry by wondering what the curricular and cultural 
conditions might be, to make knowledge of curriculum as a social practice 
possible. The stories we have studied, have helped us understand that practical 
knowledge has its own logic (Bourdieu, 1991). Because the stakes in this incident 
were so high, and every detail has been scrutinized, it has provided a view into 
the lived experiences that of those who had to have the courage to make 
decisions in the moment. By looking with and through the experiences of those 
involved, we were able to study what they did in the absence of sufficient 
knowledge, coordination, leadership and resources. There was a level of 
metacognition at play in these stories that made visible the ways in which the 
cultural, historical and contextual conditions led the responders to weigh their 
prior knowledge and experience against the reality of the context they were in, 
and make decisions. In other words, the case was a clear example of the social 
field acting upon the individual. Traditional forms of capital gave way to who had 
the knowledge needed in the moment. Power had been disrupted, at least 
temporarily, and in the absence of coordinated leadership, in the chaos of an 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, people acted.   
In light of our findings, the dominant social fields that emerged in this 
accident included Knowledge and Training, Communication and Coordination, 
and Physical Resources. In each of the examples, capital disintegrates; 
knowledge and training were insufficient. Even the most specialized and 
knowledgeable individuals had never experienced an accident quite like this one. 
There was minimal information about the effects of low dose exposure over long 
periods of time. Communication and Coordination proved to be needed for 
different purposes, with different groups, and across multiple professions. Habitus 
– that ability to cope with the unpredictable, overcame the deeply entrenched 
training protocols that proved insufficient in this context.   
To prepare for an accident of this magnitude is to prepare for an unknown 
crisis. The curriculum response to such an event must reflect a process that 
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promotes learning for the unexpected. The lessons learned from Fukushima 
allowed us to take note of attitudes, skills and responses of those who lived this 
very difficult experience in order to teach us about the personal and professional 
dispositions required to prepare us to think on our feet, think creatively and 
problem solve. Collectively, this research demonstrated that it is possible to 
participate in curriculum inquiries from a much broader focus; including looking at 
systems themselves, and how they function to enable or inhibit curricular goals. 
Bourdieu extended his Theory of Practice in his later work on language and 
linguistic exchange. The linguistic power of the written (prescribed) curriculum, 
the textually defined standardized objectives and measurable outcomes have 
perhaps lulled educational institutions into a false sense of certainty. They were 
produced in the conditions of a neoliberal society which values the capacity to 
demonstrate economic accountability and efficiency of publicly funded 
institutions. Overlooked perhaps, was the diversity of the social fields within 
which curricula is enacted. Stories like those shared here, have demonstrated 
that habitus, even in a reproductive educational environment can be disrupted 
and disruptive. Curriculum as a social practice, begins from the premise that we 
aim for collective impact (Kania & Kramer, 2011); moving from acting alone, to 
acting together. This was certainly the realization that the responders arrived at. 
Collaborating across disciplinary and paradigmatic boundaries is challenging 
work and was further complicated by diversity in language and culture, but we 
shared a resolve to learn together and through our collective efforts, find ways to 
respond to what was learned from the experiences of the brave men and women 
who responded to the best of their ability in the midst of a chaotic tragedy. 
A social practice approach invites individuals, each bringing particular 
expertise to the curricular dialogue, to be better able to function with an 
awareness of the whole; the varied expertise, resources, structures, contexts and 
so on, within and across system(s). It reminds us that we depend deeply on our 
humanity and our relationships to succeed. Collectively, it is possible to 
participate in curriculum inquiries from a much broader focus; including looking at 
systems themselves, and how they function to enable or inhibit curricular goals. 
And collectively, we can face our future challenges. 
Notes 
1. We wish to thank Fukushima Medical University and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, Division of Human Health for their ongoing support of a project that by its very 
nature was emergent. We would especially like to thank the courageous people of the 
Fukushima Prefecture; and the first medical responders who allowed us the privilege 
of learning with them.  
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